Introduction
The US space launch program no longer dominates the world and is, in fact, playing "catch-up" with the world's first commercial launch company, Arianespace. A healthy US space launch program could provide considerable economic advantages and is essential to assure continued low-cost military access to space. Nevertheless, President Clinton's space policy prohibits development of new launch vehicles and limits the Department of Defense to upgrades of existing launch vehicles. Because the US commercial and military space launch programs are heavily interwoven, commercial programs have not been able to compete with Ariane due primarily to the rigidity of governmental regulations which prohibit them from making the rapid and innovative decisions required to be competitive. The effort to regain the lead in the commercial space launch market has also been hindered by declining Department of Defense budgets.
Even though the US Government created the space sector, government programs should now be separated from commercial programs and allow them to compete internationally on equal footing. Until that happens, the Department of Defense should consider commercial space launch interests when making military decisions. Ariane provides the "bench mark" against which the US can base its progress. This paper identifies Ariane's advantages and makes low-cost recommendations for countering them. If they are enacted, the US can once again dominate the world commercial launch market and ensure affordable military access to space.
Does the US have a commercial space launch problem?
The US space industry lost its lead in launching commercial satellites several years ago and is falling further behind every year. For Why was Ariane able to capture the commercial launch market?
Arianespace recognized the potential of space transport market and built a line of launch vehicles tailored specifically to the needs of the world's commercial satellite organizations. 6 Ariane's competitive advantage comes from the following sources:
• The Ariane family of space launch vehicles was specifically designed to meet commercial requirements, which for the most part involve putting
Communications and observation satellites into geostationary orbit.
Ariane is able to deliver payloads directly to geostationary transfer orbit.
• Ariane offers 16 different launch configurations covering a broad range of payload sizes at consistently low prices.
• Ariane also offers a multiple payload launch capability that allows various sized satellites to be matched to one of the 16 launch configurations.
This flexibility allows Ariane to achieve a consistently high maximum payload.
• The Japanese, on the other hand, have not offered competitive prices to foreign commercial satellite customers. The earlier Nl and HI launch vehicles (hybrid American and Japanese designs) were never competitive even though they were very reliable. The new Japanese H2 is one of the world's most efficient heavy launch vehicles, but the high development costs have temporarily prohibited competitive launch pricing. 13 The Japanese intend to reduce the costs of their H2 to make them competitive with the Ariane by simplifying production with increased automation and reducing material costs by using cheaper materials and simpler structures. 14 Another tremendous setback for the Japanese H2 has been the political and environmental restriction of only being able to make four launches per year due to concerns of the local fishing industry. 15 The Japanese will become a competitive launcher of commercial satellites when they: (1) reduce costs, (2) increase the number of flights per year, and (3) establish a history of success.
How will the US compete with the emerging foreign launch competition?
For nearly a decade, Ariane has consistently launched more commercial satellites than all of the US launch vehicles combined. The US is finding that playing "catch-up" is considerably more difficult than keeping up with foreign launch competition. Lester Thurow, author of Head to Head, provides the steps required to catch up with the competition.
A country that wants to win starts by closely studying the competition. The purpose is not emulation but what the business world calls "bench marking." Find those in the world that are best at each aspect of economic performance. Measure your performance against theirs. Understand why they are better. Set yourself the target of first equaling, and then surpassing, their performance. 16 Arianespace was selected as the "bench mark" for this study because they are currently the commercial leader in space launches. Four areas have been selected for further analysis that will help identify an American strategy for regaining the commercial space market, namely launch vehicle: (1) pay load characteristics, (2) delivery costs, (3) selection process, and (4) technology.
Program comparisons uncovered a number of differences that gave Ariane a significant advantage and also offered recommended strategies for "catching-up" 17 Their goal will become a reality within the next few years.
An average of fifteen commercial satellites per year are being launched and that number is predicted to steadily increase. 18 Average payload weights have also steadily increased ( Delivery Costs. Commercial satellites typically are designed to go to geostationary orbits where they travel in synchronization with the Earth's rotation and, thus, do not to move relative to a position over the ground.
MAXIMUM t WEIGHT
Space launch vehicles generally do not take payloads directly to geostationary orbit but rather to a geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) where payload boosters take over. A GTO is a highly elliptical orbit used to take the payload out to 22,300 miles where the satellite booster motor fires to move the satellite into its final circular geostationary orbit (GEO). For this study, launch costs were estimated using payload costs per pound to reach a geostationary transfer orbit.
Do do this, overall flight costs were divided by payload weight to obtain the cost per pound rate. US Atlas, Delta, and Titan launch costs were compared to "bench marked" Ariane launchers for all commercial flights between 1988 and 1992.
Atlas 1/2, Delta 2, and the Titan 3 cost per pound rates were found to be significantly less than Ariane 4 -by as much as 25% (Figure 4) But, without a doubt, most launch vehicle selection decisions were based on cost per pound rates to deliver payloads to geostationary transfer orbit.
Technology. The review of launch vehicle technology was divided into three areas: (1) engine efficiency, (2) payload-to-takeoff weight ratios, and (3) success rates. Engine efficiency was measured using specific impulse (Isp), which is a ratio of the amount of fuel consumed to maintain a particular engine thrust. The payload-to-takeoff weight ratio compares the satellite weight to the rocket mass expended to deliver the payload to a geostationary transfer orbit.
Reliability was determined by past performance in getting a payload to reach the desired orbit. There were a number of reasons for this phenomenon: (1) a rescheduled flight on another launch vehicle would have delayed the launch for about two years, (2) contract penalties would have been costly, and (3) there was a high probability that the launch vehicle problem would be corrected before the next flight. Customers that unfortunately lost their payload to a launch vehicle failure typically recouped a percentage of satellite construction costs from flight insurance and were offered a free replacement launch as part of the warranty.
Recommendations to regain US commercial launch dominance.
Arianespace recognized the potential of commercial space transportation and built a line of launch vehicles tailored specifically to the needs of the world's commercial satellite owners. 26 To quickly review its strategy: (1) because commercial payloads are typically communications and observation satellites which require a geostationary orbit, Ariane designed its family of space launch vehicles to deliver payloads directly to geostationary transfer orbit; (2) it opted to offer numerous configurations covering a broad range of payload sizes which could be launched at consistently low prices; (3) it also designed its vehicles with a multiple payload launch capability, allowing different sizes of satellites to be matched to one of the configurations in order to achieve a consistently high maximum payload; finally, (4) it selected a launch site located near the equator providing a 15 percent energy savings over US launched spacecraft. 27 It was a brilliant strategy and it worked. Arianespace captured the commercial launch market.
Nevertheless, the data shows that when Ariane launch vehicles are compared to equal size US launch vehicles, US launch vehicles can be more economical in most cases. However, US launch vehicles lack multiple launch capability and are capable of offering the lowest rates for only one size of satellite (the one that fits their maximum vehicle weight capacity). The analysis
shows that by following a number of recommendations, the US could "catch-up"
and "get ahead." Several of these recommendations involve funding outlays by the Department of Defense even though the primary beneficiary appears to be the commercial space sector. While this may be true in part, ensuring that the military has affordable access to space is essential for guaranteeing America's security interests. The recommendations also fit neatly within the Clinton Administration preferred "dual purpose" strategy whereby government spending benefits both the public and private sector. The recommended investments are relatively low cost but promise a high pay off. The Ariane 5 multiple launch configuration will be capable of launching three satellites. This will provide a tremendous opportunity for Arianespace to match an even wider range of payloads to fill the spacecraft to its takeoff limit.
Recommendations
Costs will be unbeatable unless the US matches it with a Titan 4 SRMU and Centaur configuration capable of launching four or more satellites to a geostationary transfer orbit. The Titan 4 also needs to be modified for a more efficient flight trajectory that would go directly to a geostationary transfer orbit instead of stopping at low-Earth orbit. 28 The US already owns two islands near the equator that could be used for a new US launch facility. Baker and Howland Islands, south of the Hawaiian Islands, are located closer to the equator than either New Guinea or Kourou. The initial investment would take many years to recover but the advantages may make the difference for US space launch survival. A cost saving launch facility near the equator makes sense when one considers that geostationary satellites will be needed for decades to come. Command management structure and the Pentagon with authority to influence military decisions that concern commercial launch issues.
Closing Remarks
The survival of US commercial launch programs is, to a large extent, in the hands of the Department of Defense until commercial programs can become autonomous. Ground operations, launch facilities, and space policies are largely government controlled, even though each of the three major launch companies In conclusion, unless something is done quickly to improve US launch capabilities, it will never "catch-up" with Arianespace. The US government created the space sector and should do what it can to regain world dominance.
Ariane, which is beginning to exercise significant influence on international trade rules, will fight any subsidized launch vehicles. This means US government and commercial sector ties must be severed. However, the Department of Defense must consider commercial space launch interests when making decisions. Ariane provides an excellent "bench mark" for the US to base future launch vehicle upgrades. If the US sets the target of first equalling, and then surpassing, Ariane by incorporating these recommendations, the US could once again dominate the world commercial launch market.
